You open a six-hundred-row risk register and most rows are copies with the same threat, the same score and the same “existing control” sentence. Not a single decision comes out of this table in the management meeting. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 doesn’t impose how risk assessment is done; it only requires a repeatable process that produces consistent, valid and comparable results. This freedom opens two paths: asset-based and scenario-based assessment. Below, for ISMS owners and risk managers, we compare the two approaches in terms of workload, the risks they catch, how easily they can be explained to management and audit acceptance; there are also sample rows drawn from the same environment with both methods, and a decision order for the hybrid model.
The logic of the two approaches
ISO/IEC 27005:2022 explicitly describes two ways of identifying risks: the asset-based approach and the event-based approach. In practice, the event-based approach is usually called “scenario-based”. The difference lies in the question the analysis starts with.
Asset-based approach
The starting point is the information asset inventory. For each asset or asset group, the question is: “Which threat could harm this asset by exploiting which vulnerability?” The output is a detailed but crowded register of asset–threat–vulnerability triples. ISO/IEC 27001:2005 effectively made this approach mandatory; with the 2013 version, identifying assets stopped being required and risk assessment was brought closer to ISO 31000 logic. That historical legacy is why many organizations’ risk registers are still asset-based. The method wasn’t chosen deliberately; it was inherited.
Scenario-based approach
The starting point is events that could affect the organization’s objectives: “Ransomware encrypts production planning systems, and backups are affected too”, “A supplier’s remote access account is compromised”, “Customer drawings are uploaded to an unauthorized cloud”. Each scenario describes the risk source, the chain of events and the business outcome together. Affected assets are listed within the scenario, but the unit of analysis is the event, not the asset. The threat-oriented analysis in NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1 rests on the same logic.
Comparison table
| Criterion | Asset-based | Scenario-based |
|---|---|---|
| Input | Detailed asset inventory | Business processes, threat intelligence, incident history |
| Risk register volume | High; hundreds of rows is normal | Low; dozens of scenarios |
| Initial setup effort | High, mechanical | Medium, requires expert judgment |
| Explaining to management | Hard; you can’t see the forest for the trees | Easy; speaks the language of the business |
| Risk of scope gaps | Low; every asset is scanned | Medium; a scenario nobody thought of is missed |
| Cascading effects | Weak; assets are handled one by one | Strong; the chain of events is seen as a whole |
| Control mapping | Links directly to technical controls | Shows several control layers together |
| Updates | Needs constant maintenance as assets change | Reviewed as the threat landscape changes |
Both approaches are valid from an audit acceptance perspective. The certification auditor doesn’t look at the method’s name; they look at whether ISO/IEC 27001 clause 6.1.2 is met: are risk criteria defined, are risks assigned owners, are likelihood and consequence assessed, does applying the same process again give similar results? With a scenario-based register, the auditor’s first question is usually “Do these scenarios represent the whole scope?” With an asset-based register, the question changes: “Which of all these rows is actually being managed?”
Sample risk rows from the same environment
To see the difference, let’s take a fictional environment: a mid-sized single-site manufacturing company running ERP and MES, backing up to an on-premises NAS and also to cloud storage. Likelihood and impact on a 1–5 scale, risk score = likelihood × impact. The values are for illustration.
Asset-based rows
| Entity | Threat / vulnerability | O × E |
|---|---|---|
| ERP database server | Malware / delayed patches | 3 × 5 = 15 |
| File server | Malware / broad share permissions | 3 × 4 = 12 |
| Backup NAS | Unauthorized access / managed with a domain account | 2 × 4 = 8 |
| MES application server | Service outage / single server | 2 × 5 = 10 |
Scenario-based row
| Scenario | Affected assets | O × E |
|---|---|---|
| Ransomware spreads through an account compromised by phishing; backups on the domain-joined NAS are also encrypted, and ERP and MES are down for days | ERP, MES, file server, NAS, Active Directory | 3 × 5 = 15 |
In the asset-based register, the NAS row on its own appears as “8 – medium” and falls back in prioritization. The scenario-based row reveals the real problem: because the backups are managed from the same identity infrastructure as the production environment, the ransomware risk to the ERP becomes unrecoverable. This is a picture you may come across. A domain-joined NAS, a management interface opened with a domain admin account, a backup target sitting in the same network segment. On paper there’s a backup. In reality there’s a second target for the attacker.
On the other hand, the asset-based register caught the “MES single server” vulnerability that was never discussed in the scenario workshop. Those in the workshop focused on ransomware and missed hardware failure. One method’s blind spot is the other’s strength.
Which one when? A decision order
When choosing a methodology, answer these questions in order:
- Do you have an up-to-date asset inventory with clear owners? If not, the asset-based approach will spend the first year on the inventory. Start scenario-based and mature the inventory in parallel.
- Who will use the risk results? If it’s top management and the board, you need scenario-based output. If the main users are technical teams and control owners, asset-level detail is useful.
- Does a customer or regulator want evidence at asset level? If customer audits ask for a separate risk assessment for specific systems, keep asset-level rows at least for those systems.
- How homogeneous is the environment? If there are hundreds of similar endpoints and servers, working with asset groups becomes unavoidable; individual asset rows can’t be maintained.
- Is there an experienced team to assess risk? The quality of the scenario-based method depends on the knowledge of the people in the workshop. If experience is limited, an asset-based checklist approach misses less.
If most answers point to the scenario side but question 3 or 5 points to the asset side, the hybrid model is the most sensible option.
Hybrid approach
The hybrid model has two layers, linked to each other by explicit reference:
- Top layer – scenario register: A number of scenarios management can discuss in a single meeting. The risk owner is the process or business unit manager; risk appetite and risk acceptance criteria are applied at this layer.
- Lower layer – critical asset groups: Threat–vulnerability analysis for asset groups named in scenarios with high confidentiality, integrity or availability value. This layer catches technical control gaps and justifies scenario likelihood.
- Link: Every asset-based row is linked to at least one scenario. A high-scoring asset row that can’t be linked to any scenario is a sign of a missing scenario.
In this setup, the information asset inventory stops being “a list of everything” and becomes a reference table showing which assets the scenarios touch. To narrow scope gaps, cross-check the scenario list once a year against the ISO/IEC 27002:2022 control themes and recent incident records. A topic that appears in the incident register but has no counterpart in any scenario is a missing scenario.
Mistakes you may come across
- Treating an asset-based register as “complete”: If most of hundreds of rows are copied with the same threat and the same score, no assessment was done; a template was filled in. The auditor sees this by looking at two rows.
- Limiting scenarios to threat names: Headings like “Ransomware”, “DDoS” or “Insider threat” give no basis for discussing likelihood and impact. A heading isn’t a scenario.
- Giving likelihood without justification: If existing controls and incident history aren’t written next to the score, nobody can explain the same score next year. A score passed over with “let’s say 3” in the workshop restarts the debate from scratch at the next review.
- Silently deleting old risks when the method changes: The auditor asks where the high risk in the previous register went. The answer must be ready.
Transition when the methodology changes
Moving from an asset-based register to a scenario-based or hybrid model is a planned change in the ISMS and is handled under ISO/IEC 27001 clause 6.3. A practical transition order:
- Update the methodology document: Write down the risk identification unit, scales, acceptance criteria and review frequency; get management approval.
- Prepare a mapping table: Link every row in the old register to one of the new scenarios. A row that can’t be linked either needs a new scenario or is closed with justification.
- Carry over open actions: Treatment actions linked to old risks are moved to the new scenarios; the risk treatment plan mustn’t be interrupted during the transition.
- Check SoA justifications: If old risk numbers appear as control justifications in the Statement of Applicability, update them. This is the step most often forgotten.
- Archive the old register: Don’t delete it; keep it read-only with its approval date. At the next audit, the traceability of the transition is shown with this archive.
- Get risk owners to re-approve: In a scenario-based model, risk owners usually change; residual risk acceptance is given again by the new owners.
For an end-to-end example of the process steps, see the ISMS risk analysis sample process guide. Designing the methodology for the organization and converting the existing risk register are the subject of our corporate information security risk assessment and ISO 27001 risk analysis and SoA work. The primary source for the method is the ISO/IEC 27005:2022 standard.
Frequently asked questions
Does ISO 27001 require asset-based risk assessment?
No. With ISO/IEC 27001:2013, identifying assets stopped being a mandatory starting point for risk assessment; the 2022 version also requires only a defined process that produces consistent, valid and comparable results. An asset inventory, however, is expected separately under Annex A control 5.9.
How many scenarios are enough in a scenario-based approach?
There’s no fixed number. The measure is that the scenarios represent the critical processes and significant threat sources within scope, and that management can actually discuss them. Test whether gaps remain by cross-checking the scenario list against control themes and incident history.
In a hybrid approach, at which layer is risk acceptance made?
The acceptance decision is usually made at the scenario layer by the business-side risk owner. Rows in the asset layer support the justification for the scenario’s likelihood and impact; separate acceptance is needed only for risks that exceed the acceptance threshold on their own.
Does a change of methodology cause problems in a certification audit?
Not if the change was planned, the methodology document was approved and there’s a traceable mapping between the old and new registers. A transition that can’t show where the old high risks were moved to increases the risk of a finding.