When a ransom note appears on ERP screens during the night shift, either it’s clear who will print the labels for the 07:00 shipment, and with which system, or it isn’t. If it isn’t, what you have is a document, not a contingency plan. IATF 16949 SI 3 expects contingency plans to also cover cyber attacks on information technology systems and their effectiveness to be tested periodically. A plan’s success is judged not just by the document but by the results and records measured in a controlled exercise. Below is the structure of the plan for manufacturing sites and how to design the exercise.
Structure of the plan
| Section | Content |
|---|---|
| Scope and triggers | When the plan is activated: ransomware detection, ERP/MES unavailability, abnormal traffic on the production network, compromise of identity systems. |
| Crisis team and authority | Decision maker, IT incident manager, production, quality, logistics, communications; deputies and a contact list. |
| First response | Isolation decision, evidence preservation, call for external support. |
| Production continuity | Alternative working instructions: manual work orders, offline labeling, shipment prioritization. |
| Customer notification | Under what conditions, by whom, through which channel and with what content notification is made. |
| Recovery | Recovery order of systems, clean backup verification (see DRP). |
| Restart verification | After an emergency in which production stopped without the normal shutdown steps being followed, verifying on restart that the product meets the customer specification (6.1.2.3). Checking the data produced during the outage is an additional step Eretek recommends. |
| Testing and review | Exercise program, at least annual top management review. |
Don’t skip two practical details when writing the plan. First: the contact list must also exist on paper. If ransomware has also encrypted the email server and file shares, a phone list sitting on a share as a PDF is useless. Second: the authority to isolate must be given to a person in advance. Looking for the answer to “Can we cut the internet?” in a management meeting during an incident buys the attacker hours.
Scenario selection: risk-based
Scenarios should come from the risk analysis and business impact analysis. The ones most often chosen at manufacturing sites:
- The ERP server is encrypted by ransomware and shipping labels can’t be printed.
- MES or line PCs are shut down because of malware.
- A machine supplier’s remote access account is compromised.
- Access to the internet and cloud services is cut for days.
- The domain (Active Directory) admin account is compromised.
Don’t play the same scenario every year. If you tested the decision flow with ERP encryption in the first year, choose Active Directory compromise in the second: this scenario reveals whether the backup system and admin accounts depend on the domain. That’s a weakness you may well find. If the backup server is a domain member and the admin account is shared, the attacker can delete the backups too.
Exercise types
| Type | What is tested? | Impact on production |
|---|---|---|
| Tabletop | Decision flow, roles, communication, customer notification | None |
| Technical test | Restore from backup, bringing an alternative system into operation | Test environment or maintenance window |
| Functional exercise | Trying the alternative working method on the shop floor (e.g. manual labeling) | Planned, limited |
A tabletop exercise shows the decision flow but doesn’t measure technical time. “We’ll restore in four hours” is an estimate if no technical test has been done. SI 3 doesn’t set a fixed frequency for testing; what’s at least annual is the review of the plans. A sample annual program includes at least one tabletop and one technical test; plan the functional exercise in production’s quietest period, on a limited line. The actual restore time measured in the technical test should be compared with the target time in the plan, and the difference should go into the report.
Sample tabletop exercise flow
- T+0: A ransom note appears on ERP screens during the night shift. Who is called, and who declares the incident?
- T+1 hour: Labels for the morning shipment can’t be printed. Is the alternative working instruction activated?
- T+4 hours: It’s unclear whether backups were affected too. How will a clean backup be verified, and what’s the restore order?
- T+8 hours: Customer delivery will be late. Who makes the notification decision, and with what content?
- Restart: How will the traceability and conformity of parts produced during the outage be verified?
At each step, the facilitator gives an “inject” and observes not the participants’ answer but whether the answer follows the plan. If the plan says “the IT incident manager makes the isolation decision” and everyone at the table looks at the general manager, that’s a finding. An observer should note times and decisions with timestamps; the report is written from these notes.
The restart step is the one most often skipped, and from an IATF perspective the most important. How will the lot, operator and inspection records of parts produced with manual work orders during the outage be entered back into the system? If there’s no answer to this question, traceability breaks. The quality department should own this step.
Clarify three things when preparing for the exercise. Objective: What do you want to measure in this exercise (decision time, notification flow, restore time)? Boundary: Which systems won’t be touched, and under what conditions will production not be stopped? Stop rule: If a real problem comes up during the technical test, who ends the exercise, and with what code word? If these three points aren’t written down, a technical test can turn into an incident of its own. If possible, run the technical test in a test environment separate from the production network, using copies restored from backup.
What the exercise report should contain
- Date, scenario, participants and exercise type.
- Measured times (decision, isolation, restore) and comparison with targets.
- Gaps identified, with actions that have an owner and target date.
- Changes to be made to the plan.
- A record that it was presented to top management review.
The auditor looks less at the report itself than at whether the actions arising from it have been closed. If the previous exercise had the finding “contact list not up to date” and the same finding appears again in this year’s report, the process isn’t working. Link the actions to your corrective action system.
The plan and exercise must be consistent with the cyber incident response plan and the disaster recovery plan; otherwise, during an incident, three separate documents give three separate instructions. For the other IT evidence requested alongside this plan in the audit, see the IATF 16949 IT evidence guide. Test the roles of the production, IT and management teams on a scenario during a cyber incident response exercise.
Eretek doesn’t carry out IATF 16949 certification and doesn’t take on the whole quality management system; this guide covers the standard’s expectations related to IT and cybersecurity. The current SI text should be followed on the IATF Global Oversight website.
Frequently asked questions
Should the exercise be run by an external firm?
SI 3 states that tests can be done with internal or external resources. An external facilitator increases the realism of the scenario and the impartiality of observation.
Is a real customer notified during the exercise?
No. The notification decision, content and channel are tested within the scenario; no message is sent to a real customer.
How detailed should the plan and exercise be?
It depends on the risk level and the complexity of the site. What matters is covering critical processes, roles, alternative working methods and customer notification.
For a scenario and exercise program suited to your site, take a look at our IATF 16949 Cyber Attack and Contingency Exercise service.